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INTRODUCTION
"Personal responsibility" is not currently a term of art in tort law.
It does not occur in tort literature with any great frequency, and
certainly not with any uniformity of usage or meaning. One
occasionally comes across a reference to "personal responsibility"
when referring to the core tort notion of the putative defendant's
responsibility to conform his or her conduct to societally and legally
required norms. For example, Professor John G. Fleming, writing
that tort law is "fast shedding the last vestiges of any punitive
function," has identified "loss distribution," not "personal responsibili-
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of LawJ.D., The Ohio State University College
of Law.
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ty and guilt," as the focus of modem tort law.' Much more common-
ly, however, the ubiquitous term "duty" is employed to indicate a
defendant's responsibility to potential plaintiffs. Thus, the well-known
Prosser and Keeton hornbook on torts speaks of "[a] duty or
obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to
a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against
unreasonable risks."
2
Given that the phrase "personal responsibility" is thus currently
devoid of a recognized tort-law meaning and, therefore, available for
use, I have appropriated it as a term to refer to a plaintiff's responsi-
bility, or, rather, to what I propose should be recognized as a
responsibility inhering in one who may suffer an injury. As used in
this Article, "personal responsibility" refers to the notion that the
person who bears primary responsibility for personal injury damages
is the person who has been damaged, not the one who caused the
damage. When a leg is broken, who initially bears the loss? The
person whose leg is broken, of course. That person must, in the first
instance, deal with the pain, the treatment, the inconvenience, and
often the expense of the injury. Modem tort law is all about whether
some or all of the monetary incidents of the injury should later be
shifted to another party.3 But it is inescapable that prior to shifting
1. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV.
14'78, 1484 (1966). Professor Fleming also identified "enterprise liability" as an emerging focus
of modem tort law, which, together with loss distribution, is "pushing into the background
individualistic notions of personal responsibility and guilt." Id.; see infra note 3 and accompany-
ing text (discussing enterprise liability).
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 1 (5th ed.
1984) (emphasis added). This "duty" is one of four elements required to establish a negligence
cause of action. Id. § 30, at 1-4. The three other required elements are: (1) a "failure on the
[defendant's] part to conform to the standard required;" (2) a "reasonably close causal
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury;" and (3) an "actual loss or damage"
to the interests of the plalntiff. Id.
3. The other party to whom the loss would be shifted might be the tortfeasor, or the
tortfeasor's employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or even an entity in an
appropriate cooperative business relationship with the tortfeasor under either the doctrine of
enterprise liability or the doctrine of market-share liability. Respondeat superior is the Latin term
for a type of "imputed negligence," or "vicarious liability." Id. § 69, at 499. Through operation
of this concept one person may be held liable for the negligent conduct of another merely
because of a special relationship, such as master and servant. Id. § 69, at 500. See Sindell v.
Abbot Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 983-35 (Cal. 1980) (explaining "enterprise liability" as shifting the
burden of proof of causation to multiple defendants in products liability cases only where
industry is comprised of small number of manufacturers, all manufacturers had independently
adhered to industry-wide safety standards, responsibility for safety was in part delegated to trade
association, cooperation in manufacture and design was industry-wide, and plaintiff could
establish by preponderance that one of manufacturers was source of product), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980). See id. at 936-38 (explaining that traditional standard of negligence is
inadequate to protect plaintiffs harmed by fungible goods that are not traceable to single
manufacturer). The court accepted a theory of causation that would recognize a defendant
manufacturer's liability for an untraceable defective product to roughly equal its market share,
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any part of the loss, a large measure of damage, and the responsibility
for coping with that damage, resides with the person who has been
injured. Moreover, significant parts of a personal injury, for example,
the pain and suffering, never really can be shifted at all. We engage
in a fiction that such losses are imposed on tortfeasors through the
payment of money damages, but in reality they are not shifted; the
plaintiff, and only the plaintiff, suffers the physical pain and mental
trauma of the injury and, therefore, is responsible for dealing with
them.4
All of this may seem obvious, but the modem law of torts has
focused not so much on the responsibility of the person injured as on
the status of that person as a "victim." Victimhood is a relatively new
status granted to plaintiffs or potential plaintiffs. In 1859, Francis
Hilliard published the first American treatise on the law of torts.'
The term "victim" does not appear anywhere in that work. Nor is
there any reference to tortiously injured persons as "victims" in the
tort law discussions contained in The Common Law by Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., published in 1881.6 A turning point of sorts may have
come in 1965, with the publication of Professors Keeton and
O'Connell's seminal blueprint for no-fault legislation, Basic Protection
for the Traffic Victim." Beyond its presence in the title, the term
"victim" appears with great frequency in the text. One typical passage
asks:
Why do we isolate automobile accidents for special consideration?
The person injured in an automobile accident is, after all, only one
of many kinds of victims of mischance and hazard. Why not include
in our concern all of these victim--among others, the victims of the
power lawn mower, cancer, and the fall at home?8
In modem legal writing, "victim" is the term of art applied to any
person who has been injured and, therefore, may seek redress under
unless it can demonstrate that it could not have made the product that harmed the plaintiff.
Id. at 937. For market-share liability to apply, a substantial percentage of all manufacturers of
the indistinguishable goods complained of must be joined by the plaintiff. Id.
4. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (developing concept that money is
incapable of truly making plaintiff whole because pain and suffering are intangible).
5. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS iii-iv (1859).
6. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
7. ROBERT E. KEETON &JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTEGTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrIM:
A BLUEPRINT FORREFORMINGAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). Professors Keeton and O'Connell
proposed a new plan of basic protection for traffic "victims" that would include "a new form of
compulsory automobile insurance" along with legislation that would preclude or lessen tort
liability for insureds. I& at 273.
8. Id. at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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modern tort law.9
The distinction between viewing an injured person as a victim, on
the one hand, or as the one who has primary responsibility for
bearing his own losses, on the other, is perhaps subtle, but nonethe-
less significant. Webster's Third New International Dictionary lists the
first two meanings of "victim" as "[(1)] a living being sacrificed to
some deity or in the performance of a religious rite[, and (2)]
someone put to death, tortured, or mulcted by another: a person
subjected to oppression, deprivation, or suffering."" A victim is,
therefore, someone who is helpless-killed, tortured, or sacrificed.
The presence of a victim cries out for the victimizer's identification
and punishment. In this light, it is not surprising that compensation
for the injured has become a primary goal of our tort system,"
because forcing the victim to shoulder her own losses would be to
victimize her again.
The thesis of personal responsibility, on the other hand, would view
those injured in accidents not as helpless victims, but as resourceful
human beings, often with vast monetary, social, and psychological
systems available to assist them in coping with the consequences of
injury, apart from any recourse to litigation. Take a hypothetical
person injured in a two-car automobile accident. The person suffers
physical injuries, for which he incurs medical expenses: doctors' bills,
hospital bills, medication, and so forth. The person is likely covered
by a group health insurance policy, which pays most or all of these
expenses.' 2 To the extent that there are gaps in this coverage, like
deductibles and co-payments, the injured person's own automobile
insurance will provide reimbursement for these losses.' Moreover,
as a result of the injury, the person may also miss work, resulting in
lost wages. The person is probably covered by a disability income
9. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 1, at 1478 (discussing collateral source rule and pointing
out that modem "victims" of misfortune have numerous resources besides damages from
tortfeasor to make them whole); Carla L Harcourt, Child Restraint Litigation: Compensating the
Littlest V ctim TRIAL, Apr. 1995, at 32, 36 (explaining issues surrounding civil suits alleging
failure of automotive child restraints, and characterizing children injured or killed by defective
restraints as "victims").
10. WEB5E's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIGrIONARY 2550 (1986).
11. See grnera/y Nancy A. Weston, The Metaphysics of Modem Tort Theoy, 28 VAL U. L REV.
919, 938 (1994) (examining several schools of thought regarding goals and purposes of tort law
and explaining that compensation is given as primary justification for tort law in one
economically-oriented school).
12. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing extent to which most people
have insurance coverage).
13. SeeJOHN ALAN APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4902.25, at
249 (1981) (explaining that medical pay provisions usually cover insured owner while present
in vehicle in addition to other persons, such as relatives and persons driving with owner's
permission).
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policy, however, which will reimburse him for all or a significant part
of his lost wages. 4 Our hypothetical injured party, therefore, is
made whole without having to pursue any tort remedy, at least with
respect to major monetary damages. Such an individual has exercised
personal responsibility: recognizing in advance the possibility of
incurring medical expenses or lost wages, from whatever cause, and
choosing to provide for that eventuality by purchasing appropriate
insurance protection. Such an individual deserves our approval, if not
our applause.
This leads to the ultimate thesis of personal responsibility as applied
to tort law and as that term is used in this Article. If all persons
exercised personal responsibility, would there be any real need for
tort-based compensation? The answer is no. Personal responsibility,
carried to its logical conclusion, means that each individual should
bear the responsibility for those personal injury losses that she suffers.
Hence, the appropriateness of the term "personal responsibility." It
is "personal" because individuals look to themselves as the source of
provision, not casting about to others or to society at large; it is
"responsibility" because it imposes on individuals an obligation to take
appropriate and available steps to provide for their own future losses.
This is not quite as radical as it may appear at first glance. Many
kinds of losses in society are already handled in exactly this manner.
For example, suppose one's home is struck by lightning,15 catches
fire, and bums. Who bears the loss? Barring some extraordinary
theory of negligent design in the building of the house, it is the
homeowner who shoulders the loss. Usually, the homeowner has
exercised personal responsibility by purchasing in advance a fire
insurance policy that compensates for the loss. 16  If she has not,
however, most of us are still not tempted to try to shift the loss. This
is a corollary of the personal responsibility thesis: even if a person
takes no steps to insure against future loss, she still bears the loss.
This is often called "self-insurance" or, as one of my law school
professors was fond of saying, "no-insurance." It is, nevertheless, a
choice we allow people to make with respect to many types of
property loss, as well as other losses.
14. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (examining insurance buying patterns).
15. A fire caused by someone's negligence can be viewed as "accidental." Our current legal
system thus differentiates between these two types of accidents, mandating government-coerced
compensation in one case (negligence), but leaving the lightning "victim" to his or her own
devices.
.16. Mortgage lenders require property insurance for all mortgaged property.
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A full-blown application of such a personal responsibility thesis to
personal injury law would be tantamount to the dismantling of our
modem tort law. Such an abolition of the current tort system is an
idea that has been discussed with increasing frequency and serious-
ness in recent years. For example, Professor Sugarman has written,
"It is time, I believe, to focus academic and political attention once
more on doing away with ordinary tort actions for personal injury."17
Notions of personal responsibility ultimately could support such an
approach. In fact, an examination of historical and modem tort law
and principles reveals that there are strains of personal responsibility
already present and operating. Part I of this Article reviews, from a
personal responsibility perspective, several areas of the law of torts,
including mitigation of damages, the collateral source rule, and
automobile no-fault legislation. Part II addresses some problems
raised by the implementation of a personal responsibility model,
including non-economic damages, insurance availability and utiliza-
tion, and considerations of policy and morality.
I. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS
The concept that injured persons themselves must bear the losses
associated with their injuries is not foreign to American tort law.
More than a century ago, in presenting his highly influential early
analysis of tort theory, Justice Holmes stated with confidence: "The
general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where
it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human
being is the instrument of misfortune." 8 The context within which
Justice Holmes arrived at this conclusion is somewhat remarkable. In
the centuries preceding Justice Holmes' writing in 1881 of the work
cited, The Common Law, it could scarcely be said that there existed a
coherent legal system properly called the law of torts. 19 In fact, the
first American torts treatise was not published until 185920 and torts
17. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL L. REV. 558, 558 (1985); see
also William F. Foster, Some Comments in Favour of the Abolition of Fault Law, 8 AKRON L. REV. 57,
59-62 (1974) (arguing that system of accident compensation based on notion of fault, while
appealing to laypersons' sense ofjustice, misconceives true source of most accidents, which is
really human error rather than moral failure or calculated disregard of consequences).
18. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 94.
19. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLEcTUAL HISTORY 3-19
(1980) (explaining development of tort law as result of changes in jurisprudential thought as
well as spread of industrialization in late 19th century).
20. lId at 3 (referring to FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS
(1859)).
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was not taught as a separate subject in law schools until 1870.21
Prior to the early nineteenth century, recovery for personal injury was
available only for those able to bring themselves within the ambit of
a discrete number of very specific writs.2 During this time period,
therefore, personal responsibility, or the reality that injured parties
shouldered their own losses, was the rule; liability in tort was the
exception.
Even after the common law of torts matured into a fault-based
system at the end of the nineteenth century,23 there were (and still
are today) a multiplicity of doctrines that had the effect of imposing
on plaintiffs the responsibility for their own damages. At common
law, a plaintiff who was aware of a negligently created risk and who
nevertheless voluntarily confronted it, was barred from recovering
damages under the doctrine of assumption of risk.24 It is not a
stretch, therefore, to say that under assumption of risk, having
exercised an informed personal choice, the responsibility for the
resulting damages rested with the injured party.' Again, at common
law, the lack of any substantial duty owed to trespassers resulted in
personal responsibility-the trespassers' responsibility for bearing
their own losses. 26  The common law rule that no recovery was
available for wrongful death27 made an entire class of plaintiffs
responsible for its own damages. Finding that a plaintiff's injuries
21. Id. Furthermore, no torts casebooks appeared until 1874, whenJ. Ames' A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS was published. Id. at 3, 246 n.4.
22. SeWHrrE, supra note 19, at 3-19 (stating that no systematized body oflaw governed tort
suits during first half of 19th century and that series of unrelated writs formed bases for suits).
23. See KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 75, at 535 ("Until about the close of the nineteenth
century, the history of the law of torts was that of a slow, and somewhat unsteady, progress
toward the recognition of the fault' or moral responsibility as the basis of the remedy.").
24. KEETON ET AL, supra note 2, § 68, at 481. Similarly, under the common law doctrine
of contributory negligence, a plaintiff at fault was barred from recovering damages. See id. § 65,
at 451-52 (explaining that theory of contributory negligence holds that plaintiff forfeits claim
to recovery from defendant if plaintiff has engaged in conduct which "falls below the standard
to which he is required to conform for his own protection"). Contributory negligence, however,
is most accurately viewed not as a rule of personal responsibility, but rather as an extension of
the fault principle; that is, the one whose fault caused the injury, even if he is the plaintiff,
should bear the loss. Id. Comparative fault, which treats plantiffs less harshly than the doctrine
of contributory negligence, recognizes that fault may lie with the plaintiff as well as with the
defendant, but that this fact does not necessarily preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages.
Id. § 67, at 468-69.
25. KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 68, at 481 (noting that, in many cases, plaintiff's choice
to encounter known and unreasonable risks operates as contributory negligence).
26. KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 58, at 393-95 (explaining that landowners have no duty
to trespassers). Professor Prosser states explicitly that under the principles governing
landowners' liability to outsiders, trespassers "are expected to look out for themselves." Id. § 58,
at 393. Further, "the responsibility is theirs" for whatever risks trespassers encounter. Id.
27. KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 125A, at 940-42. This rule of non-liability was eventually
overturned by statute in every U.S.jurisdiction. Id. § 127, at 945.
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were not proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, either
because they were not reasonably foreseeable, or because of the
intervention of some superseding cause, such as an act of God,
resulted in the injured party absorbing his or her own losses.28 By
statute or common law rule,29 a majority of states imposed personal
responsibility on non-paying automobile passengers.3 0 In short, any
doctrine or defense resulting in non-liability can be viewed as
reaching a personal responsibility result. At least at common law,
there was a plethora of such devices. The doctrine that contains the
clearest expression of a personal responsibility policy, however, is the
rule of avoidable consequences, also known as mitigation of damages.
A. Mitigation of Damages and Personal Responsibility
One popular formulation of the mitigation rule is set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in the section entitled "Avoidable
Consequences."3  It states:
(1) [O]ne injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover
damages for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of
reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.
(2) One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular
harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm or
was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it, unless the
injured person with knowledge of the danger of the harm inten-
tionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests.
3 2
Collova v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. s3 is a classic example
of the mitigation rule. In Collova, the plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident.' Despite suffering from what she testified was
severe and constant pain, she declined a variety of medical treatments
and delayed visiting her doctor.3 3 When she eventually did meet
with her doctor, she refused his recommendations for hospitalization
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 42, at 272-319.
29. For a comprehensive and chronological list of state statutes that have been repealed,
seeJamesJ. WoodsJr., Guest Statutes: Goodbye and Good Raddance, 16 Gurm. L. REv. 263, 264, app.
A. at 287-90 (1986).
30. For a comprehensive list of other statutes and their current invalidity, see id. (arguing
for repeal of "guest statutes," which insulate drivers from any liability to injured guests, and
commenting favorably on common law rule that drivers use reasonable care for safety of all
passengers whether paying or not).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
32. Id.
33. 99 N.W. 2d 740 (Wis. 1959).
34. Collova v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 740, 741 (Wis. 1959).
35. Id. at 742. The accident happened on a Friday night, but the plaintiff did not see a
doctor until Monday morning. Id.
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and further evaluation. 6 When questioned about her behavior by
the defendant's attorney, she bristled, "Don't talk about hospitals. I
wouldn't go."" Upholding the request of providing the jury with a
mitigation instruction in the context of the plaintiff's contention that
inadequate damages were awarded, the court held:
No injured person is required to undergo surgery or treatment that
is hazardous or unduly expensive, but one injured by the wrong of
another is obliged to exercise reasonable care to minimize
damages. This obligation includes the seeking of medical care as
well as the following of the advice of the physician consulted in
order to alleviate the injury.a
The doctrine of mitigation of damages requires that plaintiffs take
responsibility for their own damages, at least to the extent of taking
steps to minimize the loss. Obviously, if a plaintiff could reasonably
take action to eliminate the damages, rather than merely minimizing
them, the law would require that he or she do so. In effect, purchas-
ing appropriate insurance coverage before a loss occurs could
eliminate the subsequent monetary burden of the loss. Personal
responsibility, as defined above, is therefore consistent with the
existing notions embodied in the rule of mitigation.
According to the Restatement, mitigation is required if it can be done
with "reasonable effort." 9 Providing in advance for the eventuality
of accidental loss requires no unreasonable effort. Purchasing of an
insurance policy is not difficult. In fact, the kinds of coverages that
would mitigate personal injury losses-medical and disability
insurance-are already commonly purchased by the vast majority of
Americans' because of the need to protect against non-accident-
related illnesses. In that sense, such advance mitigation requires no
additional effort at all.
The Restatement also indicates that mitigation is required if an
individual can do so by means of a "reasonable expenditure."4 In
36. Id. at 743.
37. 1& at 742.
38. Id. at 743; see alsoAmbrose v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 284 F.2d 802, 803 (4th Cir. 1960)
("It is the duty of a plaintiff to minimize his damages by submitting to reasonable treatment.").
In Ambrose, the plaintiff seaman had been injured in the course of his employment while helping
to raise an anchor. Id. at 802-03. Although the plaintiff claimed to suffer a back injury, he
refused to submit to a diagnostic test or to corrective surgery. Id. at 803. The Fourth Circuit
held that the plaintiff was not substantially prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to allow him
to testify that a doctor had informed him that the diagnostic procedure was dangerous, thus
causing him to reasonably fear the procedure. Id.
39. RESrATEmENT, supra note 31, at § 918(1).
40. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text (discussing widespread availability and
purchase of various types of insurance coverage).
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, at § 918 cm. e.
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analyzing this provision and its companion "reasonable effort"
language, a comment to the Restatement provides:
A person whose body has been hurt or whose things have been
damaged may not be unreasonable in refusing to expend money or
effort in repairing the hurt or preventing further harm. Whether
he is unreasonable in refusing the effort or expense depends upon
the amount of harm that may result if he does not do so, the
chance that the harm will result if nothing is done, the amount of
money or effort required as a preventive, his ability to provide it
and the likelihood that the measures will be successful. There must
also be considered the personal situation of the plaintiff. A poor
man cannot be expected to diminish his resources by the expendi-
ture of an amount that might be expected from a person of greater
wealth. So too, whether it is unreasonable for a slightly injured
person not to seek medical advice may depend on his ability to pay
for it without financial embarrassment. ... If he has adequate
resources, he must use them to minimize the loss.42
In the same way that the effort involved in obtaining advance
protection against accident losses is not unreasonable, likewise the
expenditure required is not unreasonable. This is primarily because
it is an expense that almost all of us undertake anyway.43 That is,
because it is so common to provide against non-accident-related
illness and resulting disability via health insurance and disability
income insurance, and because those policies also can provide
coverage for medical expenses and disabilities arising out of an
accident, no additional expense is required. Most people, therefore,
have already engaged in this mitigation of damages. Even if the
purchase of separate insurance coverage were for some reason
required, the expense would still be reasonable. Under the language
of the comment to the Restatement, there is an extremely high
"likelihood that the measures [here, purchasing insurance] will be
successful,"" and, barring insolvency of the insurer, advance
mitigation of damages by means of insurance always "works."
Moreover, accident insurance is relatively inexpensive."
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, at § 918(1).
43. See infranotes 116-22 and accompanying text (discussing high percentages of population
purchasing various types of insurance).
44. RESTATEMiENT, supra note 31, at § 918 cmt. e.
45. See APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 13, § 4902.55, at 278 ("From an actuarial point
of view, accident insurance can be written much more cheaply than health insurance. Travel
accident policies bear, perhaps, the lowest incidence of risk of all such contracts."). "Writing"
the risk is an insurance term of art that refers to covering a class of losses, not the physical
writing of the contract. Thus, insurance that can be "written" cheaply means insurance for
which low premiums result.
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Even beyond the practical application of personal responsibility
involved in the purchase of insurance coverage, one must remember
that my notion of personal responsibility at its core evolves from a
view of each individual's more general obligation to provide for his
or her own well-being.46 The doctrine of mitigation of damages is
consistent with that policy. For example, in Ostrowski v. Azzara,47 a
diabetic plaintiff had a sore toe that her podiatrist treated by
removing an ingrown toenail.'8 The plaintiff subsequently alleged
that the removal was ill-advised and unnecessary.49 The site did not
heal and later required multiple surgical interventions because of
vascular problems." One issue considered on appeal was whether
the plaintiffs post-removal health habits could be considered under
a mitigation theory."t Specifically, plaintiff's doctors advised her not
to smoke after the toenail removal, but she did not heed their
advice. 2 Trial testimony indicated that smoking may aggravate and
accelerate vascular disease, thereby possibly increasing the severity of
the plaintiffs problem by as much as fifty percent." The NewJersey
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of mitigation could properly be
applied to these facts:5
[O]nce the patient comes under the physician's care, the law can
justly expect the patient to cooperate with the health care provider
in their mutual interests. Thus, it is not unfair to expect a patient
to help avoid the consequences of the condition for which the
physician is treating her.55
The court thus recognized that potential plaintiffs have an inherent
responsibility to participate in the management of and, if possible, the
minimization of their own damages.
One aspect of the mitigation rule, at least as formulated by the
Restatement, may be problematic in the context of this Article. The
Restatement provides that mitigation must occur "after the commission
46. See supra text accompanying note 4 (describing unrealistic notion in tort law that pain
and suffering of plaintiff can be shifted).
47. 545 A.2d 148 (NJ. 1988).
48. Ostrowski v. Azzara, 545 A.2d 148, 149-50 (N.J. 1988).
49. Id. at 150.
50. 1L at 149-50.
51. 1& at 150-51, 153-55.
52. Id at 150.
53. Id
54. Id. at 155-57. The court was careful to limit the reach of its decision by stipulating that
only post-treatment conduct may be submitted to a jury as evidence of the plaintiffs own
contribution to her condition. ML at 156. To allow any evidence of poor pre-treatment, sef-care
would effectively subject plaintiffs to a standard of a "normative life-style," which society has
chosen not to impose as a matter of policy. I& at 155.
55. rd. at 156.
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of the tort."56 This Article's proposal that personal responsibility as
a type of mitigation may require advance purchase of insurance
coverage, however, obviously contemplates action before the commis-
sion of the tort. At least one court has strictly maintained that
mitigation of damages can only apply to a plaintiff's post-accident
actions." Other courts, however, have held that the concept of
mitigation can properly be applied to pre-accident conduct. In
Halvorson v. Voeller,5 for example, the plaintiff suffered severe head
injuries as a result of being thrown from his motorcycle while not
wearing a helmet. 9 The defendant sought to invoke a mitigation
theory to argue for a reduction in damages, contending that plaintiff's
injuries would have been less serious had he been wearing a hel-
met.'" The court described the legal issue as follows:
One of the major criticisms of considering a plaintiffs failure to use
a safety device in mitigation of damages which has moved some
courts to reject the helmet defense ... is that the doctrine of
mitigation of damages, sometimes called the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, has been traditionally used by courts to reduce
damages for injuries a plaintiff could have avoided or made less
severe by reasonable conduct on his part after he has suffered an
initial injury. Where the failure to minimize injury is allegedly due
to a person's nonuse of a helmet, the criticism is that the omission
to wear a helmet is an act which occurred before, and not after, the
plaintiff sustained an injury.6
Nevertheless, the court adopted a mitigation approach, and conclud-
ed that "evidence of a person's failure to wear a protective helmet
while traveling on a motorcycle is admissible to reduce the plaintiff's
damages."
62
56. RE STATEMENT, supra note 31, at § 918(1) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 225 P. 202, 205 (Or. 1924) (polning out
that doctrine of avoidable consequences, in contrast to contributory negligence, focuses on post-
injury acts of plaintiff). The court in Dippol therefore, recognized "the distinction between
contributory negligence as a bar to an action for damages and mitigation of damages arising
from the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care in avoiding the results of injury after same
has happened." I& (citing Theiler v. Tillamook County, 158 P. 804 (Or. 1916)); see also supra
note 54 (explaining that court in Ostrowskilimited mitigation of damages to plaintiff's post-injury
behavior).
58. 336 N.W. 2d 118 (N.D. 1983).
59. Halvorson v. Voeller, 336 N.W.2d 118, 119 (N.D. 1983).
60. Ia"
61. 1& at 120 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 121. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the New York Court of
Appeals' reasoning in Spier v. Barker, which held that the availability of a seat belt was such a
unique opportunity for plaintiffs to minimize damages beforehand that a departure from the
general rule limiting mitigation considerations to post-injury conduct wasjustified. Id. (citing
Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974)). The North Dakota Supreme Court analogized
motorcycle helmets to seat belts to reach the same conclusion. Ma. The issue of pre-incident
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The issue of pre-accident mitigation also has arisen in the so-called
"seat belt defense" cases.63 In those cases, the contention is that the
plaintiff, who was not wearing a seat belt, would not have been as
seriously injured had he been wearing one, and that the damages,
therefore, should be reduced.' A number of courts have adopted
such a rule.' Accordingly, it has become apparent that the courts
are advancing a fundamental principle of personal responsibility: the
potential plaintiff's obligation to take steps prior to an accident to
reduce or eliminate the adverse impact of the subsequent loss.
A leading "seat belt defense" case is Spier v. Barker.66 In Spier, the
New York Court of Appeals held that
nonuse of an available seat belt, and expert testimony in regard
thereto, is a factor which the jury may consider ... in arriving at its
determination as to whether the plaintiff has exercised due care,
not only to avoid injury to himself, but to mitigate any injury he
would likely sustain.67
The opinion further explained that: "[I]n our opinion, the seat belt
affords the automobile occupant an unusual and ordinarily unavail-
able means by which he or she may minimize his or her damages prior
to the accident." ' The court was persuaded that, unlike other types
of injured plaintiffs, "an automobile occupant may readily protect
mitigation also arises in the context of employees' suits against their employers. SeeJohnson v.
Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 414 N.W. 2d 425, 433 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (maintaining that
employee's failure to wear goggles was properly considered as basis for mitigating damages paid
by employer where employee had been trained in workplace safety and had been instructed
repeatedly to wear goggles); Collins v. Boeing Co., 483 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that worker's failure to take advance security precautions with regard to his tools, which
were later stolen, raised mitigation issue with respect to employer's liability to secure premises).
63. See eg., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447,453 (Fla. 1984) (holding
that seat belt defense is "viable" in Florida); Thomas v. Henson, 696 P.2d 1010, 1016 (N.M.
1984) (changing course from prior decisions and recognizing seat belt defense in context of pre-
accident mitigation); Spier, 323 N.E. 2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974) (referring to "the seat belt
defense"). Evidence of failure to wear a seat belt has been exluded by some courts on the
ground that plaintiffs should not be subjected to such a standard of care. See Johnson, 414
N.W.2d at 433 (referring to Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1985); Amend v. Bell, 570
P.2d 138, 143 (Wash. 1977) (excluding evidence that plaintiff wasn't wearing seat belt because
"the plaintiff need not predict the negligence of the defendant7)).
64. See Spier, 323 N.E.2d at 166 (noting that defense expert testified at trial that seat belts
were most effective safety improvement in automobiles in past 20 years and that plaintiff
probably would not have been seriously injured if she had worn one).
65. See, e.g., Dudanas v. Plate, 358 N.E.2d 1171, 1175-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (upholding
lower court's jury instruction on seat belt non-use as basis for reduction of damages because
competent evidence established causal connection to severity of plaintiffs injuries); Vredeveld
v. Clark, 504 N.W.2d 292, 297-98 (Neb. 1993) (stating that jury instructions allowing reduction
in damages for seat belt non-use are permissible, but finding instruction improperly given
because defendant offered no proof to establish causation between plaintiffs non-use and
injuries).
66. 323 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 1974).
67. Spier v. Barker, 323 N.E. 2d 164, 167 (N.Y. 1974) (footnote omitted).
68. Id at 168.
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himself, at least partially, from the consequences of a collision."69
The court, therefore, recognized that a potential plaintiff has a
significant responsibility with regard to his or her own damages, even
to the point of planning in advance how to eliminate or reduce those
damages.7 °
The Supreme Court of Florida has also adopted the mitigation
approach to seat belt cases, observing that the result is dictated by
that court's "underlying philosophy of individual responsibility."'7
Moreover, an Arizona court, in recognizing a seat belt defense based
on a mitigation theory, observed that "the victim of a tort has the duty
to exercise due care and act diligently to protect his or her own
interests." 72 The court disclaimed any novelty in its approach, stating
that "[t]he principle that a plaintiff must undertake reasonable
measures to protect his own interest is a paradigm judicial principle
of historic origins."7s
This Article seeks to draw from these mitigation cases an analogy
between the obligation to take precautions, like fastening a seat belt
or wearing a motorcycle helmet in advance of an accident, and the
responsibility to insure against or otherwise provide for the monetary
loss associated with an accident in anticipation of such an event.74
In one unusual case, a state supreme court justice made just that
69. 1&
70. See Mark L McAlpine, Comment, A Realistic Look at the Seat Belt Defense, 1983 DETROrr
C.L REV. 827, 830 ("The seat belt allows the user to protect himself before an accident occurs.
It affords insuranceagainst the probable consequences of unpredictable accidents.... Seatbelts,
then, provide an opportunity for protection at a time when it really counts before the accident
occurs.") (emphasis added).
71. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis
added). The court limited the idea of personal responsibility, however, by carefully stating that
failure to use an available and operational seat belt is not per se negligent or unreasonable. Id.
at 454. In this court's formulation, a defendant must prove both that the non-use was
unreasonable under the circumstances and that it was causally linked to some portion of the
plaintiff's damages. I.
72. Lawv. Superior Court, 755 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986), af/'d 755 P.2d 1135,
1145 (Ariz. 1988). Because of this principle, the court held that the non-existence of a
mandatory seat belt law in Arizona did not foreclose a finding that the plaintiff was partially
responsible for her own injuries. Id.
73. i&
74. One may argue, however, that there is a substantive difference between the two
situations. In the seat belt cases, the precautions actually prevent a part of the physical injury
itself; buying insurance in advance merely lessens or eliminates the expense associated with the
injury. With regard to the compensatory function of tort law, however, this is a difference
without a distinction. When a compensatory damage award is made in a tort case, it is not in
reality a compensation for the injury. The tort award does not take an injury away; an intact leg
is not awarded for a fractured leg. Rather, the compensation is for the monetary losses resulting
from the injury. In that sense, the two situations, seat belt mitigation and "personal
responsibility," are the same.
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equation, albeit in dissent.75 In Security Insurance Agency, Inc. v.
Cox, 76 the defendant, Security Insurance, acted as a property insur-
ance broker for Cox.77 Specifically, Security had procured a policy
covering Cox's rental property, a house.7' The coverage lapsed, and
the house subsequently burned.79 Cox contended that Security had
been negligent in not obtaining other coverage. 80 The Supreme
Court of Mississippi affirmed a judgment against Security.8" Justice
Broom, dissenting, saw the case differently. He emphasized that Mr.
and Mrs. Cox were "well educated people," who knew that their
annual policy would expire when it did. 2 Therefore, according to
Justice Broom, "for almost half a year before the fire loss, the
appellees, Mr. and Mrs. Cox, had in their very own possession a policy
which was all the time saying to them by explicit terms, 'I am
lapsed-do something if you want coverage.' 8" Justice Broom
concluded that the doctrine of avoidable consequences should bar
recovery because "'a party cannot recover damages flowing from
consequences which that party could reasonably have avoided."'84
He continued:
Appellees' wounds (their uninsured fire loss) may be realistically
viewed as self-inflicted rather than resulting from any tort legally
attributable to Security. During the four months following the July
12 expiration date of their policy:
(1) Appellees made no inquiry about their coverage.
(2) They made no effort to obtain coverage from Security or any
other source.
(3) They failed to offer any payment of premium.
(4) They took no action whatever.
(5) Appellees could have avoided the consequences of negli-
gence alleged against Security.
75. See Security Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Cox, 299 So. 2d 192, 197 (Miss. 1974) (Broom, J.,
dissenting) (arguing for reduction of damages where plaintiffs failed to renew insurance policy
and basing argument on applicability of doctrine of avoidable consequences).
76. 299 So. 2d 192 (Miss. 1974).




81. Id. at 194-95. The court found against Security because it believed Security had failed
to use reasonable care and due diligence to warn the plaintiffs that their coverage would not be
renewed. Id. The facts of the case were not clear as to what notice the plaintiff had either
received or requested. Id. at 193.
82. Id. at 195 (Broom, J., dissenting).
83. I&. at 196 (Broom,J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Broom, J. dissenting) (quoting 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 30 (1965)).
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... [U]pon the facts and circumstances presented by appellees
to the lower court, the avoidable consequences doctrine should
have been recognized and applied as an insuperable barrier to
recovery by appellees.'
Admittedly, this was a different sort of tort action, where the very
tort committed by the defendant was the failure to procure a policy
of insurance. ButJustice Broom's point can be viewed as transcend-
ing the peculiar facts. It is obvious in this case that plaintiff's
obtaining of insurance would have eliminated the loss flowing from
defendant's negligence. Yet, in virtually every tort case, insurance is
available in advance to cover the monetary losses associated with the
injury.8 Personal responsibility suggests that we should expect
people to take advantage of the opportunity to insure, thus eliminat-
ing the need for superfluous tort recovery.
B. The Collateral Source Rule and Personal Responsibility
Under the collateral source rule, post-injury payments received by
a plaintiff from collateral sources, such as the plaintiff's medical and
disability insurance, do not reduce the damages otherwise recoverable
from the tortfeasor 7 The rule plays a curious role with regard to
notions of personal responsibility. Many courts have recognized
personal responsibility as one policy reason explaining and supporting
the collateral source rule. For example, according to the California
Supreme Court, the collateral source rule expresses "a policy
judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain
insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities.""8 Other
cases have used virtually identical language. 9 Purchasing first-party
85. Id. at 197 (Broom,J., dissenting). Note thatJustice Broom's analysis is harsher toward
the plaintiff than the reasoning typically cited in seat belt and helmet cases because it would bar
recovery, not merely reduce damages.
86. See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Trans. Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (1970) (noting
medical expenses in torts case paid by medical insurance).
87. SeeRESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 920A(2) and accompanying comments (a)-(c), at 513-
15. Section 920A(2) states that "[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party
from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or
a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable." Id. See generally Richard C. Maxwell, The
Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damagea, 46 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1962) (discussing
operation of rule with regard to various sources of recompense, such as insurance proceeds,
employment benefits, and social benefits legislation, and concluding that allowing multiple
recoveries for plaintiffs' losses may be at odds with compensation function of tort law but
performs needed function of simplifying litigation).
88. Helfend, 465 P.2d at 66.
89. See, e.g., Younts v. Baldor Elec. Co., 832 S.W.2d 832, 836-37 (Ark. 1992) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) ("As applied to insurance benefits, the collateral source rule expresses a policy
judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance ... .'") (quoting
JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE § 10:2, at 416 (2d ed. 1991)); Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Super. Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 522, 524 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The collateral source
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insurance in advance of an accident to mitigate personal injury
damages is, of course, central to personal responsibility as this Article
has used that term. Furthermore, at least one commentator has
recognized that benefits from collateral sources are in fact a type of
potential mitigation of damages. Professor Fleming noted that
"[h]igh ranking among the oddities of American accident law is the
so-called 'collateral source' rule which ordains that, in computing
damages against a tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed on account of
benefits received by the plaintiff from other sources, even though they
have partially or wholly mitigated his loss."9"
In application, the collateral source rule works at cross-purposes
with a theory of personal responsibility. By refusing to even acknowl-
edge the presence of collateral insurance benefits for purposes of tort
recovery, the doctrine sends a clear signal that such insurance, and
the commendable personal responsibility evidenced by it, is irrelevant
to the tort system. If the courts truly want to provide an incentive to
the purchasing of insurance as a policy goal,9 a system based on
personal responsibility would be more effective; in such a system,
one's own insurance would be the sole source for recovery of
damages.92
C. Automobile No-Fault and Personal Responsibility
The closest American law has come to implementing a system based
on personal responsibility is in the area of automobile no-fault
legislation. Approximately a dozen states have comprehensive no-fault
systems in place.93 Under a no-fault regime, drivers purchase first-
rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain
insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.") (quoting Helfend v. Southern Cal.
Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970)); McGlohon v. Ogden, 299 S.E. 2d 581, 583 (Ga.
Ct. App.) (finding that "[t]he collateral source rule expresses a policyjudgment in favor of
encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance...."), reud, 808 S.E. 2d 541 (Ga.
1983).
90. Fleming, supra note 1, at 1478 (emphasis added); see also Maxwell, supra note 87, at 669-
70 (stating that collateral source rule operates as limitation on doctrine of "avoidable
consequences" and related principle that benefits to plaintiff flowing from wrongful act should
be credited to defendant).
91. See supra text accompanying note 88 (quoting California Supreme Court's explanation
of policy rationale underlying collateral source rule).
92. More than half of the states have engaged in legislative elimination or modification of
the collateral source rule. SeeJOHN W. WADE Er AL, PROSSER, WADE & SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ToRTs 522-23 n.5 (9th ed. 1994) (citing legislative initiatives in Arizona,
California, Kansas, New Hampshire, and New York).
93. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -725 (1987 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 627-730 to -
7405 (1993 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10C-103 to :1OC408 (Supp. 1992 & 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1993 & Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010
to -350 (Baldwin 1987 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 90, §§ 34Ato 34R (1989 & Supp. 1995);
MICH. COMp LAWS §§ 500.3101 to 500.3179 (1994 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41 to .71
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party insurance policies to cover their own accident losses.94 Benefits
are payable under these policies regardless of who was at fault in
causing the accident.95 These first-party benefits act as a substitute
for what might otherwise be available as a tort recovery-that is, at
least below certain thresholds, persons injured in automobile
accidents are precluded from suing in tort.96
At first blush, no-fault legislation may appear to embody the essence
of personal responsibility. Two common facets of these statutes,
however, render them less than ideal models of personal responsibility
theory in practice. First, all of the statutes have thresholds above
which the tort preclusion does not occur. For example, Florida's no-
fault statute still allows tort actions where there is "[s]ignificant and
permanent loss of an important bodily function, ... [plermanent
injury, . . . [or s]ignificant and permanent scarring or disfigure-
ment."97 Kansas allows tort actions where the injured party's medical
expenses total $2000 or more.98 The number of actions actually
removed from the tort system, therefore, is limited. Second, only a
relatively narrow category of minor accidents has any personal
responsibility principle imposed. From a theoretical perspective, it is
important to understand how the no-fault states handle the potential
presence of uninsured motorists. Under every no-fault statute, the
first-party insurance that supports the system is compulsory-all
motorists must purchase the basic coverage.99 A pure personal
responsibility model would leave up to each individual the choice of
whether to insure his or her own potential losses. Most no-fault
statutes create a state fund or pool to provide compensation to
persons who are not covered by first-party coverage.00 In practice,
(1994 & Supp. 1995); NJ. REv. STAT. §§ 39:6A-1 to -35 (1990 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 5101-5109 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-41-01 to -19 (1995); 75
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1701-1725 (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-22-301 to -315 (1994 &
Supp. 1995).
94. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3104, 40-3107 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
95. NJ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (1990 & Supp. 1995).
96. MICH. COMP. LAws. § 500.3135(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
97. FLA. STAT. ch. 627-737(2) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3117 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
99. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-02 (1995) ("The owner of a motor vehicle required to
be registered in this state... shall continuously provide ... security for payment of basic no-
fault benefits and the liabilities covered under the motor vehicle liability insurance."). Such
compulsory coverage is redundant and duplicative for most motorists. See Frederic G. Levin,
rsiting lorida's No-Fault Expeience: Is It Now Constitutional?, 54 FLA. B. J. 123, 124 (1980)
(explaining that Florida's no-fault law requires drivers to buy personal injury protection coverage
for their losses arising from accidents, but 90% of Floridians already have private medical and
wage loss insurance).
100. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.63 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (requiring insurance providers to
participate in "assigned claims plan" whereby claims against uninsured motorists are assigned
to insurers so as to allocate costs).
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all that the no-fault states have done, however, is to transfer accident
compensation from one state-regulated system (tort law) to another
state-imposed system (no-fault)."'
II. IMPLEMENTING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Problem of Non-economic Damages
Aside from the generally revolutionary nature of enacting a system
based on personal responsibility, by necessity the proposal raises a
number of specific issues, not yet addressed in this Article." 2
Perhaps the most significant matter is how to deal with non-economic
damages, especially damages for pain and suffering. Under the
personal responsibility model as this Article has introduced it, each
individual is responsible for taking care of his or her own damages in
what might otherwise be a tort liability context. For most, this would
involve the purchase of appropriate medical and disability insurance
coverage, which would cover the monetary impact of the personal
injury. This proposal, however, does not envision any recovery from
any party for pain and suffering.
This Article does not deny either the existence or the seriousness
of physical or mental pain and suffering. These are, however, very
personal matters. As this Article has described above, personal
responsibility springs from the notion that personal injury and its
consequences "belong" to the individual injured party. 3 This
proposition is in no context more true than for pain and suffering.
Each person is unique. Each person's pain is unique. Each person
deals with suffering in his or her own way, and only that individual
can determine the best way for that individual to handle the trauma.
Accordingly, notions of personal responsibility would dictate that the
law not attempt to interfere with the individual's responsibility to deal
with the psychic consequences of his or her own loss.
A few examples from case law emphasize the responsibility that
each person has with regard to his or her own losses. In Casimere v.
101. For additional discussion of this issue in a broader context, see infra notes 128-31 and
accompanying text.
102. There are also many potential constitutional problems with changing to a system based
on personal responsibility. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 13-15 (Fla. 1974)
(upholding constitutionality of substantial portions of Florida's no-fault statute, but only because
statute provided "reasonable alternative" to tort action that was being abrogated). See generally
Kenneth Vinson, Constitutional Stumbling Blocks to Legislative Tort Reform, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
31 (1987) (discussing substantive due process challenges to Florida's no-fault statute).
103. Seesupranotes 2-4 and accompanying text (proposing that personal responsibility means
injured party should be primarily accountable for loss regardless of assignment of fault).
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Herman,1° the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident,
which resulted in continuing emotional trauma." At issue on
appeal was the damage award to plaintiff for "future pain and
suffering" due to the emotional disorder."' At trial, the plaintiff's
psychologist testified that the emotional trauma needed treatment,
otherwise it could persist for a lifetime.1 7 In overturning the jury's
award for future pain and suffering, the court observed:
[T]he testimony of [plaintiff's psychologist] is pregnant with the
admission that the mental condition from which the respondent
suffers is reversible. [The psychologist] states that the disability will
persist "as long as treatment is not instituted."
Moreover, the record is devoid of any attempt on the part of the
respondent to mitigate damage by undergoing the treatment
allegedly required to cure or ameliorate her mental problems.
The appellant cannot be expected to pay for a lifetime's disability
or pain if proper medical treatment or psychotherapy can reason-
ably correct the respondent's ailments.'0
As in the mitigation cases discussed earlier, the core notion is that
a large measure of responsibility for damages lies with the individual
who has suffered those damages."° This is especially true with
regard to pain and suffering. Similarly, in a case contemplating
damages for a plaintiff's fear that paralysis might occur in the future,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the proper inquiry for
mitigation of damages is "[w] hether the one entertaining the fear has
done all he reasonably could to control his apprehension .... "11o
We have long engaged in the fiction that we are compensating
plaintiffs for their pain and suffering by allowing the payment of
monetary damages; but such compensation is just that-a fiction. In
fact, recent tort theorists have shown a marked willingness to do
104. 137 N.W. 2d 73 (Wis. 1965).
105. Casimere v. Herman, 137 N.W.2d 73, 77 (Wis. 1965).
106. ME at 74.
107. Id. at 77.
108. 1& at 77-78 (citations omitted).
109. See supra notes 32-85 and accompanying text (discussing theory that injured party is
personally responsible for mitigating damages).
110. Smith v. Boston & Me. R.R., 177 A. 729, 738 (N.H. 1935).
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without monetary compensation for pain and suffering."' One
commentator observed:
We have come to accept almost without question the monetary
evaluation of the immeasurable perturbations of the spirit. But why
should the law measure in monetary terms a loss which has no
monetary dimensions?... The pain I have suffered may leave me
a better or a worse man, it may leave me with a memory of pain or
a sense of gratitude for pain departed. To put a monetary value on
the unpleasant emotional characteristics of experience is to
function without any intelligible guiding premise."2
Another commentator's perspective is, if anything, even more
strident
[T]here should be no compensation for intangible harm. Despite
propaganda campaigns by trial lawyers' associations seeking to
convince the public that pain and suffering damages are the
inalienable birthright of every freedom-loving American, virtually
inscribed in the Constitution, surveys of victims repeatedly demon-
strate that most do not want it, though they do want defendants to
acknowledge the wrong inflicted. Just as the present system of
compensating pecuniary loss treats equals unequally (all people are
created equal), so compensation for intangibles treats unequals
equally (every human experience is unique). Nonpecuniary
damages also dehumanize the response to misfortune, substituting
money for compassion, arousingjealousy instead of sympathy, and
treating experience and love as commodities.11
s
A third commentator emphasized that the willingness to forego
compensation for pain and suffering "does not mean that we are
indifferent to the experience of pain and suffering, but rather only
that money does not make up the difference."' 4 From a personal
responsibility perspective, this means allowing the individual most
capable of dealing with the loss to sustain and manage the damage.
111. See Stanley Ingber, Rehinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772,
781-85 (1985) (suggesting only pecuniary damages be paid to compensate pain and suffering
losses) ;Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants'Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return
for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fee. 1981 U. ILL L. REV. 333, 348-50 (proposing elimination
of pain and suffering damages in personal injury cases). No-fault statutes also either abolish or
limit damages for pain and suffering. See, e.g., FLk. STAT. ch. 627.737(2) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
112. Louis L.Jaffe, Damagesfor Personal Injumy: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEIP.
PROBS. 219, 222 (1953).
113. Richard L Abel, A Critique of Torts, 2 TORT L REv. 99, 111 (1994).
114. David W. Leebron, Final Moments: DamageforPain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 256, 274 (1989).
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Perhaps we would ultimately find that "a certain toughening of the
mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be.""5
To the extent that an individual's pursuit of post-accident mental
and emotional well-being involves assistance and treatment by
medical, psychiatric, and psychological professionals, such expenses
are readily covered through an individual's own medical insurance,
which places these expenses on the same footing as other medical
expenses for purposes of personal responsibility. Moreover, it is not
clear that pain and suffering itself could not be the subject of a first-
party insurance contract," 6 although most people would be unlikely
to purchase such coverage.
1 7
B. Insurance Utilization and Availability
Another key issue is whether a sufficient combination of private
insurance and social programs exists to make a personal responsibility
regime realistic. Most commentators think the answer is yes.
Professor Fleming provides an historic perspective:
In olden days an accident victim would rarely have been able to
draw to any substantial extent on outside sources for meeting his
expenses and making up for his loss of earnings during disability.
Very occasionally he might have possessed an accident policy, and
perhaps a little life insurance. Even then, it makes no undue
demand on one's imagination to surmise that, at any rate, prior to
the advent of the automobile, most people who stood in the way of
torts belonged-as they still largely do-to the lower orders who
would rarely have had the providence, even if they had commanded
the means, to pay for insurance. However that may be, the
accident victim would ordinarily have had to resign himself to
drawing upon his own savings or throwing himself upon chari-
ty-which at best was random in incidence and meager in dimen-
sion. Other sources there were none: tort law provided the
principal, usually the sole, source of compensation for injuries
suffered." 8
115. Calvert Magruder, Mental and EmotionalDisturbance in theLaw of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1035 (1936) (attributing common law's reluctance to recognize mental distress damages
to policy decision that law would be ineffective in dealing with what is essentially social control
problem).
116. See Leebron, supra note 114, at 273-74 (discussing possibility of insuring against loss of
"freedom from pain and suffering").
117. SeeLeebron, supra note 114, at 273-74 (concluding that insurance coverage for pain and
suffering is unlikely given that money cannot fully compensate such losses).
118. Fleming, supra note 1, at 1478.
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Professor Fleming further posits that the modem welfare state, with
its numerous social funds and programs, has significantly altered this
historical reliance on tort law for compensation.1 9 He explains:
Tort recovery has thus long ceased to be the only, or even the
principal, source of repairing accident losses, besides the private
resources of the victim himself. More typically today, some or all
of the losses will have been taken care of by one or more [public
social insurance systems or "private sector" welfare provisions such
as health care fringe benefits] long before the injured party gets
within the reach of what the slow and cumbrous common-law
process may eventually afford him by way of tort damages.12
Moreover, according to Professor Sugarman, who has documented
the status of private American insurance coverage,' approximately
two-thirds of working Americans are covered by formal private
employee benefit plans that provide for income replacement upon
disability,'22 and about eighty-five percent of all Americans are
covered by adequate medical insurance. 2 The state of Florida
provides a typical example. In 1980, nine out of ten Floridians had
medical insurance, which covered more than eighty-eight percent of
their medical expenses incident to an accident. 24 More than ninety
percent of civilian employees were protected by private disability
income insurance.'2
Although the current levels of utilization of such insurance, as
described above, are significant, even more important for personal
responsibility purposes is the widespread availability of these types of
insurance coverage. 26  For example, according to Professor
Rahdert:
First-party health and/or accident insurance is now widely available
to many potential victims, usually through the relatively efficient
mechanism of group policies maintained by employers. First-party
insurance for accidental death is also widely available., Life
insurance of one form or another is very common. Disability
insurance is also widely available and usually very inexpensive,
although it is notably underused. Together, these kinds of
119. Fleming, supra note 1, at 1478-80.
120. Fleming, supra note 1, at 1480.
121. See Sugarman, supra note 17, at 645-50 (examining current status of collateral sources
for tort victims for lost income, medical expenses, and other damages, including rehabilitation
expenses and general damages for pain and suffering).
122. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 645.
123. Sugarman, supra note 17, at 647.
124. Levin, supra note 99, at 124.
125. Levin, supra note 99, at 124.
126. See MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 133 (1995) (noting that some types
of first-party coverage against accident costs are widely available).
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insurance could cover the most immediate costs that accidents
cause ....
... Most Americans probably either have or could purchase most
of these kinds of insurance.1
27
Insurance coverage might never be available to all. The uninsur-
able, such as those with preexisting medical conditions, and those in
poverty, for example, remain problematic. Where would a personal
responsibility system leave them? The short answer is that it would
leave them in the same position in which they are now with regard to
illnesses, injuries, and disabilities that are not currently within the
scope of the tort compensation system. 2 " If society determines that
the poor and uninsurable should be provided with basic medical
expenses, then perhaps state or federal legislation is appropriate; but
it makes little sense to use one segment of the population as a
justification for leaving in place a tort system that is increasingly
unwieldy.'2 9 This raises the larger question: Is it the government's
responsibility to assure that persons suffering personal injuries are
compensated for their losses? Many modem tort theorist assume that
the answer is yes." ° Even those who advocate the abolition of the
current tort system do so only with the understanding that it will be
replaced by some sort of comprehensive alternative reparation
system.13 ' Personal responsibility, on the other hand, would place
the responsibility for losses on those who suffer the losses, rather than
on the government or government-managed legal systems.
C. Policy and Morality
In the minds of many, tort law is more than just a system of
accident compensation. Some view tort law as serving a deterrent
127. Id. at 42, 133.
128. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insuranc, and Tort
Refora: Toward a New Viion of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 81
(1993). Professors Abraham and Liebman explain that "it is important to recognize that people
who have no health insurance are not necessarily denied health care. Many of the uninsured
are treated at public and nonprofit hospitals, which do not collect most of the charges billed
to uninsured patients." Id.
129. See KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, at 1-3 (discussing problems with and need for
reform of laws, institutions, insurance arrangements, and practices governing automobile claims
system).
130. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48
U. CHI.L.REv. 781,787-92 (1981); Richard Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and
Government Regudation, 33 VAND. L REV. 1281, 1288-89 (1980); Sugarman, supra note 17, at 622-
44.
131. See Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbusement 53 VA. L REv. 774, 795-814 (1967) (promoting use of social insurance and
selective reimbursement in lieu of fault-based compensation system).
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function.1 2 Others view it as a mechanism for punishing wrongdo-
ers.5 3  A system based on personal responsibility, where those
injured would shoulder their own losses, would accomplish neither
deterrence nor punishment. There is a two-fold response, however.
First, with regard to the vast majority of tort actions, that is, those
based on negligence and strict liability, modem tort law is ineffective
with regard to advancing deterrence and punishment goals." 4
Second, to the extent that those goals need to be pursued, other
societal mechanisms can be utilized to accomplish those ends."s
Another rationale for the existence of a tort remedy, however, is
perhaps not so easily dismissed. Professor Epstein and others argue
that fundamental fairness and morality require one who causes harm
to another to compensate the injured party.' Such a view is often
termed "corrective justice."3 7 It could be somewhat troubling that
a system of personal responsibility might eliminate this moral compo-
nent. But would it? Assuming, arguendo, that there is a moral duty to
compensate one to whom you have caused injury, such a moral duty
is not necessarily incompatible with a system of personal responsibility.
Under a personal responsibility regime, the law would not require the
injuring party to pay compensation, but instead would leave it to that
party to exercise his or her moral duty to do so. The concept of a
moral duty, the existence of which is undisputed, but which the law
does not enforce, is not foreign to the law of torts. For example,
there is no duty in tort to rescue one in peril: "The expert swimmer,
with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his
132. See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY w H PERSONAL INJURY LAW 3-4 (1989)
(explaining commonly held view that tort law deters undesirable and dangerous conduct).
Deterrence theory is fundamental to the "law and economics" approach to tort law. Xd at 3.
133. See id. at 62-63 (describing common view of tort law as punishing person that caused
harm, but noting that typically that person does not pay).
134. See id. at 559-91, 609-11 (explaining that tort law has failed to become meaningful
deterrent of dangerous conduct, and that punishment imposed by tort law does not necessarily
cause tortfeasor to suffer); see also Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deerrence in Tort Lau, 42
U. KAN. L REv. 115, 167 (1993) (concluding that "none of the mainstream theories of human
behavior support the likelihood that tort sanctions appropriately deter unsafe behavior").
135. See Sugarman, supra note 17, at 651-59 (suggesting more ways that regulatory agencies
can promote safety). Further, most instances of tort liability today arise from so-called objective
wrongdoing and not from conduct most would deem to be morally culpable and, therefore,
deserving of punishment. SeeJules L Coleman, The Mixed Conception of CorretiveJustice, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 427, 441-42 (1992) (explaining that, typically, "the fault or wrong is in the doing, not
in the doer," and that actor is not always blameworthy).
136. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 159-60, 187-88
(1973) (concluding that question of liability under tort should be based on fairness and that
person who causes harm should pay); see alsoWeston, supra note 11, at 956-95 (1994) (discussing
moral theories of tort law advocated by Professors Jules Coleman, Richard Epstein, George
Fletcher, and Ernest Weinrib).
137. See. Weston, supra note 11, at 979 (defining corrective justice as "set of moral
requirements that ground andjustify tort law").
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eyes, is not required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the
dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the man drown."13 That is,
the putative rescuer cannot be mulcted in tort on a theory that his or
her inaction caused the death or other injury."9 Yet, there is clearly
a moral duty to effect the rescue."4
In the same way, we might recognize a moral duty of compensation,
but not enforce that duty through the legal system. Freed from the
constraints of being forced to respond in tort, individuals and
businesses might act out of a moral and societal sense of doing the
right thing. Placing such a response in the context of personal
responsibility makes it much less daunting than it might first appear.
For the reasons previously discussed, non-economic damages would
not be viewed as appropriate for compensation. 141 With regard to
economic losses (medical and disability), however, individuals would
still be expected to satisfy most or all of their own losses through their
own insurance and other private resources. The moral duty to
compensate, therefore, would be limited to merely filling in the gaps
in the injured party's ability to shoulder his or her own loss. For
example, if an individual's health insurance coverage contains a
deductible and a co-insurance provision, the party causing the injury
may view it as appropriate to reimburse for the deductible and the co-
payment percentage, so that the injured individual has no out-of-
pocket losses. Other incidental expenses suffered as a result of the
injury might also be appropriate for compensation. As a secondary
benefit, paying voluntary compensation could serve as a healing
mechanism for the two parties, as opposed to fostering the bitterness
and adversity often engendered by the modem tort litigation
process.
142
One might doubt that such a voluntary compensation system would
ever work; that is, no one would participate without being forced to
do so. At least one modem societal system already exists whereby
huge amounts of money are transferred on a completely voluntary
basis: tipping. Almost everyone tips. Fifteen percent of a restaurant
bill, as a voluntary offering to the server, is almost universal. Barbers,
138. KEETON ET AL, supra note 2, § 56, at 375.
139. KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 56, at 375.
140. KEETON Er AL, supra note 2, § 56, at 375 ("The remedy in such cases is left to the
'higher law' ... .") (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903)).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 104-15 (asserting that victim should bear primary
responsibility for pain and suffering because he or she is most able to cope with such non-
pecuniary losses and money can never compensate victim fully).
142. See generally Leslie Bender, A Lauyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 3, 4 (1988) ("Tort law needs to be more of a system of response and caring than it is
now.").
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taxicab drivers, delivery persons, newspaper carriers-the list goes on.
And it is purely voluntary." There are few, if any, adverse conse-
quences to not tipping.'" One might argue that a tip today will
assure good service at the same restaurant next time.'" But most
of us tip without ever expecting to visit the establishment again.
In 1985 in the United States, consumers tipped more than nine
billion dollars." In the same year, compensation paid to injured
parties through the tort system was about fifteen billion dollars. 4
Because the volume of voluntary payments would be much less under
a personal responsibility system than coerced payments under the tort
system, it appears that, at least in the aggregate, voluntary payments
are a realistic alternative.
Furthermore, there already exists a quasi-voluntary payment system
which operates concurrently with the tort system-the first-aid and so-
called Medical Pay (or "med-pay") insurance coverages contained as
a part of many liability policies.'" A first-aid clause allows an
insured to volunteer assistance to the injured party, in recognition of
"the humanitarian impulses which motivate one to see that prompt
attention is given to those at the scene of an accident."149  Even
more to the point is the med-pay coverage contained in most
automobile liability policies, which allows an insured and his insurer
to pay initial medical expenses, without any determination of actual
liability.'50
143. Michael Lynn et al., Consumer Tipping. A Cross-Country Study, 20J. CONSUMER RES. 478,
479 (1993) ("Tipping is voluntary behavior. Although the decision about whether or not to
leave a tip is largely determined by social norms and customs, these norms provide a fair amount
of latitude regarding how much should be tipped.").
144. See id. at 487 (stating that electing not to tip service provider, or tipping less than social
standard, results in "social disapproval" and personal guilt).
145. Id. at 479.
146. Id. at 478.
147. SUGARMAN, supra note 132, at 40 (citingJ. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSA-
TION PAID IN TORT LrIGATION (Rand Corp. Inst. for CivilJustice ed. 1986)).
148. See APPLEMAN & APPLEmAN, supra note 13, §§ 4899-4903.85, at 200-340 (discussing
medical pay provisions in various insurance policies).
149. APPLEMAN & APPLEmAN, supra note 13, §§ 4900-4901, at 216-17.
150. APPLEMAN & AI'PLEMAN, supra note 13, § 4902, at 224-25.
Under this provision, any passenger or occupant of the insured's car who is injured in
an accident, and often pedestrians, may recover medical expenses up to a stipulated
amount, anywhere from five hundred dollars to several thousands of dollars per
person. Since such recovery is completely independent of liability on the part of the
insured, insurance under the medical indorsement [sic] clause is closely akin to a
personal accident policy ....
Medical provisions of liability, or homeowner's policies are a form of minimal group
accident insurance provided at minimal cost with a named insured as the entity
through whom the coverage is issued ....
Generally, medical payment clauses are considered to constitute separate accident
insurance coverage. Such coverage is divisible from the remainder of the policy, and
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsrnY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1245
As a related matter, if the tort system were replaced by a personal
responsibility regime, there would be another forum available for
accomplishing some of the same goals that the tort system seeks to
accomplish: the existing criminal law system, as discussed below.
There is a certain amount of discomfort associated with the notion
that one who commits an intentional tort, like battery, or a reckless
act, like driving while intoxicated, should escape being forced to pay
in some way for the consequences of his or her conduct. We would
perhaps hesitate to free such an individual from having to pay
compensatory, as well as punitive damages, especially because the
batterer or the drunk driver would probably be among the least likely
injurers to be forthcoming with voluntary compensation. The tort
system should not be left in place, however, solely to deal with these
relatively infrequent instances.'- Instead, we should utilize the
existing criminal law system as a vehicle already in place. For
example, in the case of an injury caused by a drunk driver, the injurer
will usually be prosecuted criminally for the offense. To the extent
that the injured party's own resources did not completely cover the
monetary loss, the defendant could be forced to pay restitution. 52
Similarly, if there is a need to retain the equivalent of tort punitive




The mantra of "personal responsibility" is on the lips of prominent
Americans across the political spectrum, in a variety of contexts that
creates a direct liability to the contemplated beneficiaries. The purpose is to grant
peace of mind and create a fund for the payment of medical services so that those
injured will not necessarily be contemplating how to impose liability upon the insured.
Medical payments provisions are found in almost every type of liability insurance....
The purpose is not only the salutary one of alleviating the mind of the one injured
from concern over resources with which to pay such obligations, but to dissuade the
one injured from thinking up theories upon which to sue the insured. And since the
reduction of litigation is a desirable objective, certainly that is not improper.
Id. §§ 4902, 4902.05, at 224-32 (footnotes omitted).
151. SeeJoHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 1-14 (1988) (suggesting that bulk
of tort litigation is found in products liability, medical liability, and motor-vehicle accidents).
152. Restitution is becoming more common in a variety of contexts. For example, restitution
is now available for any federal criminal conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1994). If restitution is
not ordered, there must be a statement in open court of the reason. Id. at § 3553(c).
153. Such a fine would, of course, be paid to the state, not to the injured party. There exists
some discomfort with the payment ofpunitive damages as a windfall to the plaintiff in tort cases.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987 & Supp. 1995) (requiringthat one-third of exemplary
damages awarded to plaintiff be paid into state fund).
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have little or nothing to do with tort law."s What would happen if
a system based on personal responsibility were to replace the current
tort system? Consider the following:
Scenario 1: The year is 2015. Fred is driving home from the office.
Jim, also driving home, inadvertently runs a stop sign and crashes into
Fred's car. Fred suffers a sprained neck and misses three days of work
before recovering completely. Under his employer's disability and
sick leave policy, Fred is fully compensated for the days off from work.
In addition, his group medical policy pays his doctors' bills, except for
a $100 deductible. Fred's own automobile collision coverage pays for
the damages to his car. Fred has significant neck pain for a few
weeks, which he endures; it never occurs to him that somebody
should have to pay him money because of his pain. One night, Jim
comes to Fred's house for a visit. He apologizes for running the stop
sign and injuring Fred. He voluntarily gives Fred a check for $100 to
pay for the medical expenses left uncovered because of the deduct-
ible.
Scenario 2: Same year. Jill is out for a walk in the morning. Bob
has been drinking and is intoxicated; nevertheless, he is driving.
Because of his inebriation, he veers onto the sidewalk and runs into
Jill, who suffers a compound fracture of her right leg. Jill is between
jobs, but she has purchased an individual health insurance policy.
The policy has an eighty percent/twenty percent co-insurance
provision, however, so Jill must pay twenty percent of her medical
expenses, which amounts to $1500. Bob is prosecuted criminally for
drunk driving and reckless operation of a vehicle. He is fined, given
a suspended sentence, and ordered to pay $1500 restitution to Jill.
Scenario 3: The year is still 2015. John is an occasional patron at
the Grill Room restaurant. One night, while at the Grill Room, he
slips and falls on a dinner roll dropped earlier by a waiter. John
suffers a concussion, but all his medical expenses are covered by his
own health insurance policy. John is self-employed as a building
154. According to House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey, "'[Als soon as we ask what
government should do about a problem, it releases us from our personal responsibility.'" David
S. Broder, Arrey's Axioms, WASH. POST, June 21, 1995, at A21. As a part of the dialogue
surrounding last year's Million Man March in Washington, D.C., "[President] Clinton and
[Minister] Farrakhan ... both stressed the need for personal responsibility." David Maraniss,
A ClearDay, a Cloud of Conradictions, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1995, atA21. "Everyone knows that
Republicans preach smaller government, less regulation and more personal responsibility."
Robert J. Samuelson, The Public Trust: Handle with Care, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1995, at A15.
Former presidential candidate Lamar Alexander claimed, "We need a strong voice in
Washington ... who believes that the two most important words in our country's future are
personal responsibility." Jeffrey M. Peyton, Road to Vltory '95 Informs and Inspires Christian
Activists, CHuSriAN AM., Oct. 1995, at 11.
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contractor. Accordingly, his inability to supervise his crew while
recovering costs him approximately $300 profit in the form of a timely
completion bonus that he would have made on his currentjob. The
Grill Room reimbursesJohn for the $300. John continues to frequent
the restaurant. The Grill Room, not wanting to develop a reputation
as a dangerous restaurant, institutes new waiter training and stricter
floor sweeping and inspection policies.
Welcome to the future world of personal responsibility. People who
are injured expect as a matter of course to pay for or cover their own
medical and disability expenses. Society has abandoned the notion
that you can compensate for pain and suffering by paying money.
Persons and entities who play a causal role in accidents help pay for
uncovered expenses and losses not because the law forces them to do
so, but because it seems like the right thing to do. Moreover, because
tort actions have been abolished, the judge who presides over Bob's
criminal trial does not have a docket clogged with civil cases. None
of the parties in the above-mentioned scenarios, except Bob, need to
get a lawyer. The yellow pages in 2015 no longer contain page after
page of multi-color advertisements 115 by personal-injury lawyers.
The doctrinal underpinnings of such a system are already present
in the law of torts. The rule of mitigation of damages, or avoidable
consequences, if followed to its logical conclusion, dictates that
injured parties should be required to make appropriate advance
arrangements to cover accident losses. The collateral source rule is
already in the process of being discarded and, therefore, should not
preclude personal responsibility from assuming its proper place.
Eventually, society may progress in a direction where the first words
uttered after an auto accident or other injury are "Can I help?" rather
than "Can I sue?"
155. The greater Norfolk (Virginia) Bell Alantic yellow pages for 1995.96 contains more
than 50 pages of such ads. BELL ATLANTIc, 1995-96 YELLOw PAGES (SouTH HAMPTON ROADS)
616-71 (1995).
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